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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FOR NUISANCE
AND TAKINGS CLAIMS IN TEXAS AFTER
CITY OF DALLAS V. JENNINGS
Eliot Shavin *
Chad Baruch**
UNDREDS of scholarly articles and thousands of cases' have
examined the law of nuisance since William Prosser concluded in
1942 that "virtually nothing of any consequence has been written
on the subject .... ,,2 Sixty-two years and a mountain of legal writing
later, the law of nuisance remains "a sort of legal garbage can."13 The law
of takings has not received as much scholarly attention as the law of nui-
sance, but nevertheless the law of nuisance remains an "impenetrable
jungle." 4 The intersection of nuisance and takings law-in the form of
claims against governmental entities-has been the subject of numerous
judicial decisions but few scholarly articles. With isolated exceptions,
these judicial decisions have done little to clarify the corpus of "mislead-
ing and inaccurate '" 5 writings on these subjects, particularly as they relate
to the element of intent necessary to each claim.
On June 25, 2004, the Texas Supreme Court delivered its opinion in
City of Dallas v. Jennings,6 clarifying the level of intent required to main-
tain a constitutional takings claim in Texas and announcing new law con-
cerning the viability of nuisance claims against governmental entities.
The Jennings decision, however, expands the scope of governmental im-
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1. Even by 1906, the issue of nuisance was termed "a much litigated and vexatious
one .... ' JOSEPH A. JOYCE & HOWARD C. JOYCE, TREATISE ON THE LAW GOVERNING
NUISANCES iii (1906).
2. William L. Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEX. L. REV. 399, 410 (1942). Pro-
fessor Prosser's statement is puzzling, as there were at the time he wrote it at least two
substantial works on the law of nuisance. See generally H.G. WOOD, A PRACICAL TREA-
TISE ON THE LAW OF NUISANCES IN THEIR VARIOUS FORMS (2d ed. 1883); JOYCE & JOYCE,
supra note 1.
3. Prosser, supra note 2, at 410.
4. Page Keeton, Torts, 26 Sw. L.J. 3, 14 (1972).
5. Id.
6. City of Dallas v. Jennings, 142 S.W.3d 310, 314 (Tex. 2004).
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munity for nuisance claims beyond advisable limits and leaves unan-
swered critical questions concerning both nuisance and takings claims.
This article reviews the elements of nuisance and takings claims, ex-
plores the history and purposes of sovereign immunity, evaluates the Jen-
nings decision and its effect on nuisance and takings claims, and proposes
a resolution to what is unquestionably one of the most convoluted and
confusing areas of Texas tort law.
I. THE ELEMENTS OF NUISANCE AND TAKINGS CLAIMS
A. COMMON-LAw NUISANCE
Nuisance, as it has developed in the common law of England and the
United States, is an invasion of or interference with another's interest. If
the interest invaded or interfered with belongs to the community, then
the nuisance is a public nuisance. 7 If, on the other hand, the interest or
interference concerns an individual's private use and enjoyment of land,
then the nuisance is a private nuisance.8 Private nuisance is distinguished
from trespass in that "it does not depend upon a physical invasion of the
land, or interference with the plaintiff's exclusive possession, but merely
disturbs . . . [the] use of it."9 This article is concerned with private nui-
sance claims against governmental entities.
The elements of private nuisance are (1) a substantial interference with
another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land (2) that is the
proximate result of either (a) intentional and unreasonable, (b) negligent,
or (c) abnormally dangerous conduct.' 0 Thus, minor inconveniences and
annoyances, as well as unforeseeable consequences of otherwise lawful
activity, fall outside the sphere of nuisance law. The former are excluded
by the requirement of substantial interference and the latter by the re-
quirement of proximate cause."
The substantial interference and proximate cause requirements are, rel-
atively speaking, the cause of little confusion in nuisance law. It is the
conduct requirement that has generated much of the confusion surround-
ing nuisance claims. Prior to the twentieth century, nuisance liability was
predicated upon the harm caused to the plaintiff rather than the nature of
the defendant's conduct.t 2 This approach, exemplified by cases like
Fletcher v. Rylands,' 3 fixed liability for nuisance involving abnormally
7. "A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common to the
general public." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (1979).
8. Id. § 822.
9. Prosser, supra note 2, at 414.
10. RESTATEML-NT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979); see also Jamail v. Stoneledge
Condo. Owners Ass'n, 970 S.W.2d 673, 676 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet.).
11. Neither requirement is expressly set forth in the Restatement. The foreseeability/
proximate-cause limitation may be inferred from the use of the phrase "legal cause" in
section 822, and the substantiality restriction is established by case law. See RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) oiF TORTS § 822 (1979); Prosser, supra note 2, at 415-16 nn.122-28.
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 cmt. b (1979).
13. Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. I Ex. 265 (1866), affd, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
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dangerous conditions on the harm caused to the plaintiff without refer-
ence to the defendant's conduct. As courts began moving away from this
approach, which was essentially a strict liability standard, they focused on
the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct. This focus on the defen-
dant's conduct led to parsing of the level of scienter and, necessarily, the
degree of fault of the defendant. The law of nuisance devolved from strict
liability predicated on the substantiality of harm inflicted upon the plain-
tiff to a thicket of case-by-case analyses of the reasonableness of defend-
ants' activities.
The intentional-conduct prong of the second element of nuisance
claims is perhaps most problematic for courts 14 in that it leaves open the
central question in most nuisance claims: What level of intent is required?
Is intent to cause harm to the plaintiff necessary, or is intent to conduct the
activity sufficient? The Restatement (Second) of Torts attempts to ad-
dress this problem by defining "intentional" to include "acts for the pur-
pose of causing [the invasion]" as well as acts leading to consequences
"substantially certain" to result from the intended conduct.15 This defini-
tion, however, is no more satisfactory than the intent element itself be-
cause it lacks any sort of standard. The comments to the definition shed
little light:
It is not enough to make an invasion intentional that the actor real-
izes or should realize that his conduct involves a serious risk or likeli-
hood of causing the invasion. He must either act for the purpose of
causing it or know that it is resulting or is substantially certain to
result from his conduct.' 6
The difficulty arises in attempting to determine the difference between
realizing that conduct involves a serious risk or likelihood of causing the
invasion and knowing the invasion is substantially certain to result. De-
spite this lack of precision, courts generally have held that intent to do
the act that causes harm is insufficient to impose liability for nuisance.' 7
On the other hand, intent to harm is a sufficient though not necessary
element of an intentional nuisance claim. Finally, intentional action cou-
pled with a substantial certainty that the conduct will cause the harm gen-
erally is sufficient to result in liability.t 8
14. See, e.g., Wright v. Masonite Corp., 368 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1966); Hall v. Phillips,
436 N.W.2d 139 (Neb. 1989); Snow v. City of Columbia, 409 S.E.2d 797 (S.C. Ct. App.
1991); Bible Baptist Church v. City of Cleburne, 848 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. App.-Waco 1993,
writ denied); Vogel v. Grant-Lafayette Elec. Coop., 548 N.W.2d 829 (Wis. 1996).
15. RFSTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 825 (1979).
16. Id. § 825 cmt. c.
17. See, e.g., Wright, 368 F.2d at 661 (following the RIESTAT'rMINT (SI[COND) OF TORTS
in a diversity case applying North Carolina law).
18. See, e.g., Hall. 436 N.W.2d at 145-46; Vogel, 548 N.W.2d at 836; Jost v. Dairyland




A taking is an intentional governmental action for a public purpose
resulting in damage to private property without prior consent from or
adequate compensation to the landowner. 19 Negligent governmental
conduct that results in the destruction of a landowner's property is not a
taking.2 0 Takings claims are based on state21 and federal2 2 constitutional
provisions prohibiting governmental entities from taking, damaging, ap-
propriating, injuring, or destroying private property for public use with-
out adequate compensation.
Throughout most of the nineteenth century courts construed takings
clauses as limitations on legislative action rather than as sources of reme-
dies for aggrieved landowners. 23 Only after state constitutions were
amended in the 1870s and thereafter to encompass injuring, damaging, or
destroying property did courts begin to interpret takings clauses to pro-
vide a damages remedy to landowners who had suffered a loss at the
hands of the government.2 4
What remained relatively constant throughout this upheaval in takings
law was the understanding that only intentional conduct could support a
takings claim. Unlike the intent element in nuisance law requiring intent
to harm the plaintiff or substantial certainty that harm will occur,25 intent
for takings purposes often meant only the intent to perform the act or
acts that resulted in damage to the plaintiff's property.26 This apparent
difference in the intent requirements for nuisance and takings law was the
root of significant confusion.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Sovereign immunity, today represented in American law by the
broader doctrine of governmental immunity, is firmly entrenched in the
landscape of American law. Yet despite its deep roots, the very notion of
sovereign immunity has come under scathing, at times even vitriolic, criti-
19. Takings are often equated with inverse condemnations, both being grounded on
constitutional guarantees of just compensation. See, e.g., Tarrant Reg'l Water Dist. v.
Gragg, 43 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001). affld, No. 01-0362, 2004 WL 1439646,
at *12 (June 25, 2004).
20. See, e.g., City of Tyler v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489, 505 (Tex. 1997).
21. TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 17; see also Robert Brauncis, The First Constitutional 7brt:
The Remedial Revolution in Nineteenth Century State Just Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L.
REv. 57, 119-20, nn.270-71 (1999).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
23. Brauneis, supra note 21, at 60.
24. Id. at 115.
25. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., State v. Hale, 146 S.W.2d 731, 736 (Tex. 1941).
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cism from commentators27 and courts.28 The doctrine has been deemed
fit only for "discussion by students of mythology. ' 29 The result is that
sovereign immunity causes "confusion not only among the various juris-
dictions, but almost always within each jurisdiction. 3 0
A. ENGLISH ORIGINS
It is commonly asserted in scholarly literature and judicial opinions
that the roots of sovereign immunity lie in William Blackstone's oft-
quoted phrase, "The king can do no wrong. "31 In fact, medieval law., both
in England and continental Europe, contemplated liability on the part of
sovereign governments for their wrongs. 32
27. See, e.g., Leslie L. Anderson, Clains Against States, 7 VAND. L. REV. 234 (1954)
(arguing that all governments should waive immunity in tort): George W. Pugh, Historical
Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13 LA. L. REV. 476, 494 (1953) (charac-
terizing sovereign immunity as "confus[ing], conflicting ... unsound and undesirable");
Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924) (criticizing theo-
retical foundations of sovereign immunity).
28. See Kenneth S. Klein, The Validity of the Public Rights Doctrine in Light of tile
Historical Rationale of the Seventh Amendment, 21 HASTINGS CONSI'. L.Q. 1013, 1043-44
(1994) (reporting Supreme Court Justice Wilson's statement that sovereign immunity is
.'philosophically antithetical to any form of government, pragmatically antithetical to a
democracy, and clearly not contemplated by the words of the Constitution"); see also
Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341, 343 (1879) ("We do not understand that either in
reference to the government of the United States, or of the several states, or of any of their
officers, the English maxim has an existence in this country."); Stone v. Ariz. Highway
Comm'n, 381 P.2d 107, 110 (Ariz. 1963) ("This doctrine of the English common law seems
to have been windblown across the Atlantic as were the pilgrims on the Mayflower and
landed as if by chance on Plymouth Rock .... -). Some states have attempted to abrogate
the doctrine entirely. See, e.g., N.Y. CT. CL. Ac-r § 8 (McKinney 1989) (waiving common-
law doctrine of governmental immunity); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.92.090 (West 1988)
(legislatively removing governmental immunity); Colo. Racing Comm'n v. Brush Racing
Ass'n, 316 P.2d 582 (Colo. 1957) (eliminating governmental immunity); Smith v. Idaho, 473
P.2d 937 (Idaho 1970) (abrogating common-law doctrine of governmental immunity); Rice
v. Clark County, 382 P.2d 605 (Nev. 1963) (removing immunity for counties and their offi-
cials); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 115 N.W.2d 618 (Wis. 1962) (abrogating governmental
tort immunity).
29. Colo. Racing Conmm'n, 316 P.2d at 585.
30. Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 305 A.2d 877, 884 (Pa. 1973).
31. See, e.g., Janell M. Byrd, Rejecting Absolute Immunity for Federal Officials, 71
CAL. L. REV. 1707, 1709 (1983); Susan L. Smith, Governmental immunitv Issues: Can the
King Do No Wrong'?, NAr. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Summer 1991, at 16-17; Mary S. Hack,
Note, Sovereign Immunity and Public Entities in Missouri: Clarifying the Status of Hybrid
Entities, 58 Mo. L. REV. 743, 746 (1993). In its entirety, Blackstone states: "Besides the
attribute of sovereignty, the law also ascribes to the king, in his political capacity, absolute
perfection. The king can do no wrong." I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *238.
As the Supreme Court has explained, "[t]he immunity of a truly independent sovereign
from suit in its own courts has been enjoyed as a matter of absolute right for centuries.
Only the sovereign's own consent could qualify the absolute character of that immunity."
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 414 (1979); but see Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349,
353 (1907) (arguing that sovereign immunity is not based on an English concept but rather
on the practical basis "that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes
the law on which the right depends").
32. See Edwin M. Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. I, 17
(1926). The issues related to sovereign immunity, most notably the capacity of kings to be
called to account in court, have been the subject of debate and discussion for a much
longer period. The Jewish Talmud even contains a discussion as to whether a king may be
judged. See 48 TALMII) BAVL: TilE SCU(-I-TIENSTIN EDITION, Sanhedrin 19a (1994).
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By the time Henry III concluded his reign as King of England in 1272,
it was clear (at least in theory) that the Crown was immune to suit.33 The
English based this immunity on what they perceived to be a necessary
relationship between sovereignty and immunity; in the English view, per-
mitting any court to exercise jurisdiction over the King without his con-
sent would imply a superiority of power. 34 At the same time, the Crown
was regarded as the ultimate source of justice in England and therefore
was required both by law and conscience to provide remedies to ag-
grieved subjects. 35 To that end, Edward I (1272-1307)36 introduced pro-
cedures for bringing claims against the Crown, possibly modeled on his
observations of the papal court.37 The result was that, while the monarch
could not personally be subjected to the processes of the common law
courts, the British government was not insulated from liability for failure
to meet its legally imposed obligations.
B. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN AMERICA
Sovereign immunity in the United States is "one of the mysteries of
legal evolution. '38 While Americans were reluctant to adopt most as-
pects of English political theory during the Constitution's formative pe-
riod, 39 sovereign immunity nevertheless was accepted as an established
33. Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77
HARV. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1963).
34. "Hence it is, that no suit or action can be brought against the king, even in civil
matters, because no court can have jurisdiction over him. For all jurisdiction implies supe-
riority of power . I..." t WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIIS *234-35. The king was
immune, in short, because "no lord could be sued in his own court." W.S. Holdsworth, The
History of Remedies Against the Crown, 38 L.Q. REV. 141, 142 (1922); see also Jaffe, supra
note 33, at 4.
35. CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNrY 5
(1972).
36. Though popular culture and modern cinema appear to remember him primarily as
a ruthless warrior, Edward I is known to historians primarily for his advances in adminis-
trative efficiency and legal reform. In fact, his work with respect to the English common
law earned him the nickname "English Justinian." 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA Edward
I of England 434 (1981).
37. See Borchard, supra note 27, at 23. The most common form of relief was the Peti-
tion of Right, which permitted a subject to petition the Crown seeking redress for its
wrong. The procedures instituted under Edward I provided for factual investigation and
trial and for determination based upon legal standards. MELVYN R. DURCISLAG, STATE
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 4
(2002). Sovereign immunity under these procedures was "largely a legal conception, which
determined the forms of procedure in some cases but did not seriously impair the subject's
right to recovery in accordance with the substantive law." JACOBS, supra note 35, at 6.
38. Stefan Schnopp, Note, Garrett v. Sandusky: Justice Pfeifer's Fight for Full & Fair
Legal Redress: Does Sovereign Immunitv Violate Ohio's "Open Court" Provision?, 27 U.
TOL. L. REV. 729, 732 (1996) (citing Edwin M. Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in
Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1926)); see also Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 359 P.2d 457, 459
(Cal. 1961).
39. "[E]ven though at a very early date in American history we overthrew the reign of
the English King, the doctrine somehow became entrenched in our judicial code." Stone v.
Ariz. Highway Comm'n, 381 P.2d 107, 109 (Ariz. 1963). This curious development led one
court to term sovereign immunity the illegitimate offspring of English law. See Spencer v.
Gen. Hosp., 425 F.2d 479, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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doctrine when the Constitution was drafted and ratified.40
During the ratification process, few issues were as divisive as the extent
of national power. Opponents of the Constitution pointed out that Arti-
cle III extended federal judicial jurisdiction to suits "between a State and
Citizens of another State. '41 This provision, the Anti-Federalists noted,
appeared to permit suits against states upon their war debts. The finan-
cial condition of several states at the time was tenuous, 42 and permitting
such suits to proceed in federal court was viewed by advocates of states'
rights as intolerable.4 3
The Constitution's proponents were adamant that states would remain
immune from suit. Alexander Hamilton argued that sovereignty necessa-
rily entailed immunity to suit.44 According to Hamilton, such immunity
was preexisting in the states and unaffected by the Constitution.45 Other
proponents echoed these assurances. 46 The state ratification conventions
made clear their belief that the Constitution preserved the sovereign im-
40. See Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting) (-I be-
lieve there is no doubt that neither in the State now in question, nor in any other in the
Union, any particular Legislative mode, authorizing a compulsory suit for the recovery of
money against a State, was in being either when the Constitution was adopted, or at the
time the judicial act was passed."); see also David E. Engdahl, Inmunitv and Accountabil-
ity for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. CoLo. L. REV. 1, 5-9 (1972) (examining the
doctrine of sovereign immunity in colonies).
41. U.S. CONST. art. II1, § 2, cl. 1.
42. Because their funds were limited, the states were forced to incur significant debt to
purchase provisions necessary to the war effort against England. When the war ended, the
states were left to deal with their many creditors. The states owed approximately $210
million by the end of the Revolutionary War. James E. Pfander, History and State Suabil-
itv: An "Explanatory" Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269,
1 283-85 (1988).
43. "Unquestionably the doctrine of sovereign immunity was a matter of importance
in the early days of independence. Many of the States were heavily indebted as a result of
the Revolutionary War. They were vitally interested in the question whether the creation
of a new federal sovereign, with courts of its own, would automatically subject them, like
lower English lords, to suits in the courts of the 'higher' sovereign." Nevada v. Hall, 440
U.S. 410, 418 (1979) (footnote omitted).
44. "Though it may rather be a digression from the immediate subject of this paper, I
shall take occasion to mention here a supposition which has excited some alarm upon very
mistaken grounds. It has been suggested that an assignment of the public securities of one
State to the citizens of another, would enable them to prosecute that State in the federal
courts for the amount of those securities; a suggestion which the following considerations
prove to be without foundation." THE FEDERALISr No. 81, at 511 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961).
45. "It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an
individual without its consent. This is the general sense, and the general practice of man-
kind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the
government of every State in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this
immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the States, and the danger
intimated must be merely ideal .... [T]here is no color to pretend that the State govern-
ments would, by the adoption of that plan, be divested of the privilege of paying their own
debts in their own way, free from every constraint but that which flows from the obliga-
tions of good faith." Id. (emphasis in original).
46. At the Virginia ratifying convention, James Madison posited that "[i]ts jurisdiction
in controversies between a state and citizens of another state is much objected to, and
perhaps without reason. It is not in the power of individuals to call any state into court."
Madison summarized that "[lit appears to me that this [clause] can have no operation but
this-to give a citizen a right to be heard in the federal courts; and if a state should conde-
2005]
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munity of the states. 47
Despite these assurances, the Supreme Court soon created a constitu-
tional crisis by ruling to the contrary. In Chisolm v. Georgia,48 the Su-
preme Court held that Article III of the Constitution, granting federal
judicial power to controversies between States and citizens of other
states, allowed a citizen of another state to sue Georgia in federal court
without its consent. Although each of the Justices concurring in the judg-
ment wrote a separate opinion, the common thread among them was the
belief that the case fell within the literal text of Article III.4 9
"The decision fell upon the country with a profound shock. ' 50 The
states were outraged.51 The Eleventh Amendment was introduced and
adopted in direct and rapid response to Chisolm 52 to codify the federal
scend to be a party, this court may take cognizance of it." James Madison, Journal, in 3
DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 533 (Jonathan Elliot 2d ed., 1854).
John Marshall was even more forceful in his remarks:
With respect to disputes between a state and the citizens of another state, its
jurisdiction has been decried with unusual vehemence. I hope that no gen-
tleman will think that a state will be called at the bar of the federal court. Is
there no such case at present? Are there not many cases in which the legisla-
ture of Virginia is a party, and yet the state is not sued'? It is not rational to
suppose that the sovereign power should be dragged before a court. The
intent is, to enable states to recover claims of individuals residing in other
states.
Id. at 555 (emphasis in original).
47. The Rhode Island Convention stated that "'[i]t is declared by the Convention, that
the judicial power of the United States, in cases in which a state may be a party, does not
extend to criminal prosecutions, or to authorize any suit by any person against a state."
Amendments and Ratification of the Constitution by the Convention of the State of Rhode
Island and Providence Plantations, in 1 THE DEBATES IN TIlE SEVERAL STATE CONVI-N-
TIONS ON THE ADoi1'1ON OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 334, 336 (Jonathan Elliot 2d
ed., 1959) (1790). New York made a similar statement and made clear that ratification was
based in part on this assumption. Ratification by the State of New York,, in I Tiit- DEBATES
IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOI FION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITU-
TION, supra at 327, 329.
48. Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
49. Chief Justice Jay and Justice Wilson also based their opinions on the belief that
sovereign immunity was inconsistent with the principle of popular sovereignty established
by the Constitution. See Chisoln, 2 U.S. at 454-58 (Wilson, J., concurring); id. at 470-72
(Jay, C.J., concurring).
50. 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 96
(rev'd 1932); see also Note, The Sovereign Immunity of the States: The Doctrine and Some
of Its Recent Developments, 40 MINN. L. REV. 234, 236 (1956).
51. Chisolm created "a shock of surprise throughout the country." Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890). Georgia's House of Representatives passed a bill establishing that
anyone attempting to execute process in the Chisoln decision would be "guilty of [a] fel-
ony and shall suffer death, without benefit of clergy, by being hanged." DAVID P. CURRIE,
THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789-1801, at 196 (1997).
52. An amendment was introduced in the House of Representatives the day after
Chisolm was decided. WARREN, supra note 50, at 99-101. The Eleventh Amendment was
proposed in its present form on January 2, 1794. CURRIE, supra note 51, at 196 n.181. The
House and Senate each discussed and endorsed the amendment in one day. "It is plain
that just about everybody in Congress agreed the Supreme Court had misread the Consti-
tution." Id. at 196. Ratification by the required three-fourths of the states was secured on
February 7, 1795, and the Eleventh Amendment was declared part of the Constitution on
January 8, 1798. 2 TOM PENDERGAST ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: FROM
FREEDOM OF SI-EIIc 'ro FLAG BIJRNING 219 (2001). The delay between ratification and
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notion of sovereign immunity: "The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."'53
In 1821, the Supreme Court interpreted the Eleventh Amendment such
that an individual could no longer sue a state in federal court, firmly es-
tablishing governmental immunity in American law. 54 Thereafter, gov-
ernments were able to evade liability in most cases simply by asserting
the defense of governmental immunity. In 1946, however, Congress
passed the Federal Tort Claims Act (FFCA),55 waiving governmental im-
munity for the federal government in certain limited instances. The
FTCA marked the death knell for the notion that governmental immu-
nity operates as a complete bar to relief.
Two centuries after its ratification, the Eleventh Amendment remains a
legal mystery. "The United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting
the amendment have fluctuated widely and have compounded legal fic-
tion upon legal fiction."'56 The only thing certain about the Eleventh
Amendment is the lack of certainty concerning its meaning. The ques-
tions raised by Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence are not abstract. At
issue are fundamental notions of state and federal authority and sover-
eignty. The Eleventh Amendment is now the figurative battleground for
many of the disputes underlying the real battles of the Civil War. 57
C. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN TEXAS
The Texas Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of sovereign immunity
in 1847, holding that "a state cannot be sued in her own courts without
her own consent, and then only in the manner indicated by that con-
sent. '' 58 In the early part of the twentieth century, Texas courts took the
initial step toward limiting immunity by distinguishing between govern-
mental and proprietary functions. 59 Governmental functions, those per-
formed in furtherance of general law to benefit the public, continued to
fall under the protection of immunity. 60 Proprietary functions, those un-
adoption resulted from certain states failing to inform Congress of the ratification of the
amendment until late in 1797. Id. at 226.
53. U.S. CONST. amend. Xl.
54. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821).
55. Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2001)): see Jordan v. United States, 170 F.2d 21 1, 213 (5th Cir. 1948)
(discussing adoption of FTCA).
56. William P. Marshall, Foreword to MELVYN R. DURCHSLAG, STATE SOVEREIGN
IMMUNIrY: A REFERENCE GUIDE -O THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, at xiii (2002).
57. "Apparently, the sovereignty issue remains unsettled, even today. Of course, the
stakes today are much smaller. Secession is no longer an issue. But within a narrower
compass, the debate goes on." DANIEL FARIBER, LINCOLN'S CONSTITiTION 28 (2003).
58. Hosner v. DeYoung, I Tex. 764, 769 (1847).
59. See City of Amarillo v. Ware, 40 S.W.2d 57. 60 (Tex. 1931).
60. See City of Houston v. Shilling, 240 S.W.2d 1010, 1011 (Tex. 1951).
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dertaken for the benefit of persons within city limits, were unprotected. 61
Not surprisingly, courts had significant difficulty distinguishing between
the two concepts, resulting in a fairly arbitrary system of recovery62 that
was the subject of intense scholarly criticism. 63
In 1969, the Texas Legislature reacted to mounting criticism by adopt-
ing the Texas Tort Claims Act (the "Act"), waiving immunity in limited
instances. 64 In 1985, the Texas Tort Claims Act was codified with minor
modifications and is now part of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code.65 Although the Texas Act is based in large measure upon the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act, it is substantially narrower in its waiver of immu-
nity. Under the Act, a governmental unit in Texas is liable for
(1) property damage, personal injury, and death proximately caused
by the wrongful act or omission or the negligence of an employee
acting within the scope of employment if:
(A) the property damage, personal injury, or death arises from
the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or motor-driven
equipment; and
(B) the employee would be personally liable to the claimant ac-
cording to Texas law; and
(2) personal injury and death so caused by a condition or use of tan-
gible personal or real property if the government unit would, were it
a private person, be liable to the claimant according to Texas law. 66
As one Texas court has summarized the Act:
In order for immunity to be waived under the TTCA, the claim must
arise under one of the three specific areas of liability for which im-
munity is waived, and the claim must not fall under one of the excep-
tions from waiver. The three specific areas of liability for which
immunity has been waived are: (1) injury caused by an employee's
use of a motor-driven vehicle; (2) injury caused by a condition or use
61. Id. at 1011-12; see also Lawrence v. City of Wichita Falls, 906 S.W.2d 113, 116 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1995, no writ).
62. Compare Gotcher v. City of Farmersville, 151 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. 1941) (holding
operation and maintenance of sewage system to be governmental function), with Dilley v.
City of Houston, 222 S.W.2d 992 (Tex. 1949) (holding operation and maintenance of sani-
tary sewage system to be proprietary function); compare Imperial Prod. Corp. v. City of
Sweetwater, 210 F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1954) (holding maintenance of a municipal airport to be
governmental function), with City of Orange v. Lacoste, Inc., 210 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1954)(holding operation of port to be proprietary function).
63. See, e.g., Joe R. Greenhill, Should Governmental Immunity for Torts Be Re-ex-
amined, and, If So, by Whom?, 31 TEX. BAR J. 1036, 1066-72 (1968); Joe R. Greenhill &
Thomas V. Murto I1, Governmental Immunity, 49 TEX. L. REV. 462, 462-63 (1971); James
L. Hartsfield, Jr., Governmental Immunity from Suit and Liability in Texas, 27 TEX. L. REv.
337, 347-48 (1949).
64. See generally Tort Claims Act, 61st Leg., R.S., 1969 TEX. GEN. LAWS 874, repealed
by Texas Tort Claims Act, 1985 TEX. GEN. LAWS 3242, 3322 (codified as amended as Thx.
Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.001-.109 (Vernon 2004)). The original Act was
drafted in part by Professor Keeton and sponsored by Representative DeWitt Hale of
Corpus Christi. W. James Kronzer, Jr., The New Texas Tort Claim Act-some offliand
reflections, TRIAL LAW. FORUM, Nov.-Dec. 1969, at It, 12.
65. TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.001-.109 (Vernon 2004).
66. TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODiE ANN. § 101.021 (Vernon 2004).
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of tangible personal or real property; and (3) claims arising from pre-
mise defects. 67
Ill. THE JENNINGS DECISION AND ITS EFFECTS
The application of sovereign immunity to nuisance and takings law in
Texas was for many years the source of significant confusion. Texas
courts traditionally applied sovereign immunity to bar some, but certainly
not all, nuisance claims (though the demarcation line was less than clear).
With respect to takings claims, the Texas Supreme Court found a waiver
of sovereign immunity in the Takings Clause of the Texas Constitution. 68
In either case, immunity could be overcome only for claims based solely
on non-negligent acts.69 The presence of negligence by the government
in either case resulted in immunity. This rule was based upon the as-
sumption that damages arising from unintended, accidental, and negli-
gent acts do not benefit the public.70 Under Texas law, sovereign
immunity traditionally barred negligence-based nuisance and takings
claims but not non-negligence-based claims. Less clear was whether nui-
sance claims arising out of abnormally dangerous conduct were barred.7t
Prior to Jennings, Texas courts addressed abnormally dangerous con-
duct under the rubric of intentional nuisance and sometimes imposed lia-
bility on that basis.72 Thus, for example, cases involving the flooding of
67. Medrano v. City of Pearsall, 989 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999,
no pet.) (citations omitted). Of course, a private litigant does not need legislative permis-
sion to sue for a state official's violation of law. A state official's illegal or unauthorized
actions are not state actions. Dir. of Dep't of Agric. & Env't v. Printing Indus. Ass'n, 600
S.W.2d 264, 265 (Tex. 1980). Consequently, an action to determine or protect a person's
rights against a state official who has acted illegally or without statutory authority is not
subject to sovereign immunity. See Cobb v. Harrington, 190 S.W.2d 709, 712 (Tex. 1945).
68. See City of Tyler v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489, 503-04 (Tex. 1997); see also TEX. CONST.
art. I, § 17.
69. See Likes, 962 S.W.2d at 503-04; see also Tex. Highway Dep't v. Weber, 219 S.W.2d
70, 71 (Tex. 1949).
70. See Weber, 219 S.W.2d at 71.
71. Section 521 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts purports to exculpate public
actors for such conduct where it is carried out in pursuance of a public duty: "'The rules as
to strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities do not apply if the activity is carried
on in pursuance of a public duty imposed upon the actor as a public officer or employee or
as a common carrier." RESTArrEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 521 (1977). The comments to
this section of the Restatement do not discuss or even refer to the effect of constitutional
takings clauses on nuisance claims based on abnormally dangerous activities.
72. See City of San Antonio v. Pollock, No. 04-03-00403-CV, 2004 WL t835770 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio May 12, 2004) (addressing benzene leaking from a landfill). In his
nuisance-law article, commenting on Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 96 S.W.2d 221 (Tex.
1936), Prosser concluded that Texas courts accepted and applied the doctrine of strict lia-
bility for abnormally dangerous activities "under the name of nuisance without fault."
Prosser, supra note 2. at 426. The Fifth Circuit, however, interpreted Texas precedents,
including Turner, as having "'clearly rejected strict liability for abnormally dangerous activi-
ties." Doddy v. Oxy USA, Inc., 101 F.3d 448,462 (5th Cir. 1996). Keeton, commenting on
Turner, reconciled the equation of abnormally dangerous activities with intentional nui-
sances as follows:
When the defendant engages in an activity that annoys and discomforts
others in the vicinity of that activity, he is often held liable for the conse-
quential harm thereby inflicted, even though the activity is socially desirable
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land as the result of the release of water from a public dam typically gave
rise to takings claims based on the intentional acts of the governmental
actors.73 Intent in these cases was inferred from the recurring nature of
the damage, and courts had little difficulty finding that the governmental
actors knew, or at least were substantially certain, that the conduct at
issue would cause damage to the plaintiff's property. It was against this
unsettled backdrop that the Jennings case arose.
A. THE JENNINGS DECISION
In 1993, employees of the City of Dallas dislodged a clogged sewer
main. The dislodged material caused another backup that flooded raw
sewage into the home of James and Charlotte Jennings. The couple sued
the City for nuisance and unconstitutional taking. They did not argue
that the City was negligent in its operation of the sewer system but rather
claimed that flooding damage is inherent in the operation of any munici-
pal sewer system. The City sought and obtained summary judgment on
the basis of immunity.74 The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed the sum-
mary judgment,7 5 and the City appealed to the Texas Supreme Court.
The critical issue with respect to the takings claim in Jennings was the
level of intent necessary to maintain a constitutional takings claim in
Texas. The parties in Jennings agreed that only an intentional act could
give rise to a taking but disagreed as to the type of intent required to
sustain such a claim. The Jenningses argued that only intent to perform
the act causing damage is necessary. Because the City unquestionably
intended to unclog the sewer line and this action resulted in the taking,
the City-in the view of the Jenningses-was liable under the Takings
Clause. The City, on the other hand, contended that specific intent to
damage the plaintiff's property was required to support a takings claim.
The City did not intend to damage the Jennings' home and therefore ar-
gued it was not liable under the Takings Clause.76
The Texas Supreme Court rejected both positions. The court decided
that the position advanced by the Jenningses was incorrect for two rea-
and even though utmost care is exercised. But the situation is virtually al-
ways one in which he knew that the necessary effect of his activity was to
interfere with the use and enjoyment by another of his property. The inter-
ference was not accidental in Turner; it was intentional. . . . Not even the
government is allowed to take or damage property intentionally, without
paying for it. ...
Keeton, supra note 4, at 14.
73. See, e.g., Brazos River Auth. v. City of Graham, 354 S.W.2d 99, 106 (Tex. 1961);
Golden Harvest Co. v. City of Dallas, 942 S.W.2d 682, 689-90 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1997, writ
denied); Ansley v. Tarrant County Water Control & Improvement Dist. Number 1, 498
S.W.2d 469, 475 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
74. The Jenningses sought partial summary judgment themselves, claiming the raw
sewage in their home constituted a nuisance per se under provisions of Texas law defining
public health nuisances. Jennings v. City of Dallas, 142 S.W.3d 310, 312 (Tex. 2004).
75. The Court of Appeals also rendered partial summary judgment in favor of the
Jennings on the nuisance per se claim. 1I.
76. Id. at 313.
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sons. First, the imposition of liability when only the act giving rise to
damage was intentional would subject the government to a higher degree
of liability than private persons engaged in identical acts. Second, such a
standard would violate the predicate that the taking be for public use. In
the court's view, when damage is merely the accidental result of govern-
mental action, there is no public benefit and the property cannot be
termed "taken or damaged for public use."17 7
At the same time, the court also rejected the City's argument that the
government must intend to cause the damage. The court instead adopted
the rule suggested by the Restatement, holding that "if the government
knows that specific damage is substantially certain to result from its con-
duct, then takings liability may arise even when the government did not
particularly desire the property to be damaged. '78 The court summarized
its ruling on the takings claim as follows:
We therefore hold that when a governmental entity physically dam-
ages private property in order to confer a public benefit, that entity
may be liable under Article I, Section 17 if it (1) knows that a specific
act is causing identifiable harm; or (2) knows that the specific prop-
erty damage is substantially certain to result from an authorized gov-
ernment action-that is, that the damage is "necessarily an incident
to, or necessarily a consequential result of" the government's
action.79
The City argued throughout the case that the nuisance claim was a
pleading subterfuge designed to evade the City's immunity from negli-
gence claims. The City urged that the claims at issue were actually based
on allegations of negligence in connection with discretionary functions
and therefore fell within the scope of immunity preserved by the Texas
Tort Claims Act.8 0 The Jenningses responded by pointing out that they
had not alleged any claim of negligence, that there was no evidence of
any negligence by the City, and that there was complete agreement by the
parties as to the absence of any negligence. Both parties took for granted
that the City did not possess any immunity for a nuisance claim. The
court of appeals agreed, holding that the City was not entitled to immu-
nity on the nuisance claim because it was properly asserted without any
allegation of negligence.8 1
The Texas Supreme Court did not address the nuisance/negligence is-
sue considered so important by the parties and the court of appeals. In-
stead, the court held that all nuisance claims against governmental
entities in Texas are barred by immunity absent either an express waiver
in the Texas Tort Claims Act or a taking under the Texas Constitution.82
77. Id. (emphasis in original).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 314 (quoting Tex. Highway Dep't. v. Weber, 219 S.W.2d 70, 71 (Tex. 1949)).
80. Jennings v. City of Dallas, 138 S.W.3d 366. 371 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001), rev'd,
142 S.W.3d 310 (2004).
81. Id.
82. Jennings, 142 S.W.3d at 315-16.
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Because the Jenningses could not point to any waiver in the Act and be-
cause the takings claim had been adjudged deficient, the City possessed
immunity for the nuisance claim.8 3
B. EFFECTS OF THE JFNNINGS DECISION
Jennings represents a dramatic departure from existing governmental
immunity law in Texas, expanding that immunity well beyond its previous
limits. In resolving the takings claim, the court made clear that there are
only two situations in which the intent requirement may be satisfied, and
both require proof of actual knowledge by the government: (1) when the
government knows that a specific act is causing identifiable harm and (2)
when the government knows that the specific property damage sued for is
substantially certain to result from an authorized government action. s4
Even that high standard, however, was not enough-the court went on to
make clear its view that damage is "substantially certain" only where it is
"'necessarily an incident to, or necessarily a consequential result of' the
government's action. ''85
The result is that Texas citizens may no longer assert claims under the
Takings Clause absent proof of actual knowledge by the government that
damage already was occurring or was necessarily going to occur as the
result of an authorized act. In many cases, this standard will be insur-
mountable as a result of proof issues. As a practical matter, if the dam-
age is not recurring, how is a plaintiff to prove actual knowledge of its
certainty? This question is particularly troubling from a public policy per-
spective. Jennings will almost certainly provide governmental entities
with a strong incentive not to undertake extensive environmental impact
and similar studies prior to beginning significant public works projects.
After all, those very studies could well become the only means by which a
citizen might maintain future litigation against the government for dam-
ages resulting from the project. Since there is no taking absent actual
knowledge, the government could avoid liability simply by choosing not
to investigate the consequences of its actions in advance. In essence, Jen-
nings creates a rule by which the government's intentional ignorance im-
munizes it from liability under the Takings Clause.
The court's definition of "substantial certainty" insulates the govern-
ment beyond advisable limits. Substantial certainty, as defined in Jen-
nings, means something more than its ordinary definition. At least with
respect to takings claims, substantial certainty actually means absolute
certainty-it means that the damage is "necessarily" the consequence of
the government's action. In other words, Jennings appears to suggest that
the government's eighty- or ninety-percent certainty that damage will re-
sult is insufficient as a matter of law to impose liability because the dam-
age would not in that event necessarily be incident to the authorized act.
83. Id.
84. id. at 314.
85. Id.
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So long as the government can establish its good-faith belief that there
was some reasonable probability that damage to the plaintiff would not
result from its act, it can evade liability under Jennings even where it be-
lieved the damage was highly likely to take place.
In resolving the nuisance claim, the court took pains to create the im-
pression that its ruling did not represent a departure from prior nuisance
cases against governmental entities. In truth, however, Jennings repre-
sents a radical departure from-and overruling of-at least some of those
cases. Prior to Jennings, at least some Texas appellate courts believed
that the government was not immune to claims for non-negligent nui-
sance.86 Jennings implicitly overrules these prior appellate decisions per-
mitting nuisance claims without an express waiver of immunity or valid
claim under the Takings Clause. Additionally, it is difficult to reconcile
Jennings with the Texas Supreme Court's earlier decision in City of Tyler
v. Likes.87 In Likes, the court rejected the plaintiff's takings claim 88 but
nevertheless proceeded to address the accompanying nuisance claim on
the merits: "Nor may Likes recover property damages on a theory of
non-negligent nuisance. The City produced summary judgment evidence
that it did not intentionally do anything to increase the amount of water
in the watershed in which Likes's home was located." 89 The situation in
Likes mirrors that in Jennings-the court was confronted with a non-neg-
ligent nuisance claim for which it could find no express waiver of immu-
nity or valid takings claim. In Likes, the court nevertheless addressed the
merits of the nuisance claim, giving no indication that rejection of the
takings claim necessitated overruling the nuisance claim. In stark con-
trast, the Jennings court simply announced that rejection of the takings
claim mandated rejection of the nuisance claim. When juxtaposed with
the court's efforts to reconcile its holdings in prior cases to the contrary,
Jennings represents a new rule in Texas with respect to non-negligent nui-
sance claims against governmental entities.
The net result of Jennings is that governmental entities are completely
insulated from nuisance claims, whether or not they are based in negli-
gence, unless (1) the claim is for property damage, personal injury, or
death arising from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or mo-
tor-driven equipment and the employee would be personally liable to the
claimant according to Texas law; (2) the claim is for personal injury or
death caused by a condition or use of tangible, personal, or real property
if the government unit would, were it a private person, be liable to the
claimant according to Texas law; or (3) the claim also constitutes a valid
86. See, e.g., Shade v. City of Dallas, 819 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no
writ). The Shade court reversed summary judgment rendered on a nuisance claim arising
from a sewage backup because there existed "a question of fact about whether the problem
was caused by the City's negligence or whether the condition is inherent in the operation
of the sewer system itself." Id. at 582; see also Bible Baptist Church v. City of Cleburne,
848 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. App.-Waco 1993, writ denied).
87. City of Tyler v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1997).




claim under the Takings Clause, meaning that there is proof that the gov-
ernment knew that a specific act was causing identifiable harm or knew
that the specific property damage sued for was necessarily incident to or
the consequential result of an authorized government action. 90
The current regime governing nuisance claims against governmental
entities in Texas is counterintuitive at best, downright absurd at worst.
When the government undertakes large-scale projects for public bene-
fit-the classic example being the operation and maintenance of sewer
systems as in Jennings-and those projects result in damage to private
property, it will be the individual property owners who will most often
bear the financial burden of repairing the damage. The government,
which caused the damage, and citizenry, for whose benefit the damage
was caused, will be able to rely on immunity to avoid liability. When
projects are undertaken for the public benefit and subsequent damage to
private property occurs, the citizenry should absorb the cost of repairing
those damages. Individuals should not be forced to shoulder the entire
burden of repair when it can and should be spread among the
community.9'
Moreover, the government remains immune to suit even where private
property is damaged by the foreseeable consequences of a negligently
performed governmental activity. Fault on the part of the governmental
actor does not affect immunity. This rule is based on the legal fiction that
a negligently performed act cannot be of benefit to the public. 92 Again,
this rule forces individual property owners to absorb costs that are more
properly shared by the entire community. Society as a whole should
share the risk of loss for injuries caused by the negligence of government
employees performing authorized services for the community. 93 "Assum-
ing negligence or fault on the part of the government or its employees,
the public is better able to bear the risk of loss than the individual person
90. Actual knowledge may be inferred in some circumstances, most notably where
there is a recurrence of the damage. "In the case of flood-water impacts, recurrence is a
probative factor in determining the extent of the taking and whether it is necessarily inci-
dent to authorized government activity, and therefore substantially certain to occur." Tar-
rant Reg'l Water Dist. v. Gragg, No. 01-0362, 2004 WL 1439646 (Tex. June 25, 2004) (not
released).
91. See City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389, 394 (Tex. 1978) (The City of Austin
"singled out plaintiffs to bear all the costs for the community benefit without distributing
any cost among the members of the community.").
92. "The recurrence requirement assures that the government is not held liable for
taking property when a project's adverse impacts, and by implication its benefits to the
public, are too temporal or speculative to warrant compensation." Gragg, 2004 WL
1439646, at *7. The critical error in this assumption is to overlook that a particular govern-
ment action that does not appear to confer public benefit may be part of a larger govern-
ment operation that exists solely to confer public benefit. That was precisely the situation
in Jennings, where the action of unclogging the sewer line was part of the inherent overall
operation of the public sewer system.
93. This is in fact the very heart of the Takings Clause, which is based upon the pre-
mise that the government should not force "some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." Steele v. City
of Houston, 603 S.W.2d 786, 789 (Tex. 1980) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S.
40, 49 (1960); YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85, 89 (1969)).
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or family."'94
IV. A PROPOSAL TO MODIFY THE JENNINGS RULE
The Texas Supreme Court's decision in Jennings has the effect of ex-
panding the scope of governmental immunity well beyond just and advis-
able limits. The court is, however, unlikely to revisit the decision and find
a common-law waiver of immunity for nuisance claims. Since the enact-
ment of the Texas Tort Claims Act, the court has repeatedly held that the
waiver of governmental immunity is the sole province of the Texas Legis-
lature. 95 Consequently, any change in the rules governing immunity for
nuisance claims will have to be made through legislative action.
The Texas Legislature should amend the Texas Tort Claims Act to pro-
vide an express waiver of immunity for nuisance claims, whether or not
they are based in negligence. Such a waiver need not be complex-the
problem would be solved by amending Section 101.021 of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code96 to add a provision making a governmental
unit liable for
a substantial interference with another's interest in the private use
and enjoyment of land which is the proximate result of either inten-
tional and unreasonable, negligent, or abnormally dangerous con-
duct if the government unit would, were it a private person, be liable
to the claimant according to Texas law.
Additionally, Section 341.012 of the Texas Health and Safety Code97
94. Greenhill, supra note 63, at 1072.
95. See, e.g., Fed. Sign v. Tex. S. Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. 1997); Guillory v. Port of
Houston Auth., 845 S.W.2d 812, 813 (Tex. 1993); Mount Pleasant Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Lindburg, 766 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tex. 1989) (holding that "[o]nly when the legislature has
clearly and explicitly waived the state's sovereign immunity may a cause of action accrue")
(quoting Duhart v. State, 610 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Tex. 1980)); Lowe v. Tex. Tech Univ., 540
S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex. 1976); see also Greenhill, supra note 63, at 1070.
96. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021 (Vernon 2004).
97. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 341.012 (Vernon 2004). This could be ac-
complished simply by stating that "a government unit is liable for damages proximately
caused to a private property owner by the governmental unit's creation of a public health
nuisance." Section 341.011 provides that each of the following is a public health nuisance:
(1) a condition or place that is a breeding place for flies and that is in a
populous area;
(2) spoiled or diseased meats intended for human consumption;
(3) a restaurant, food market, bakery, other place of business, or vehicle in
which food is prepared, packed, stored, transported, sold, or served to the
public that is not constantly maintained in a sanitary condition;
(4) a place, condition, or building controlled or operated by a state or local
government agency that is not maintained in a sanitary condition;
(5) sewage, human excreta, wastewater, garbage, or other organic wastes de-
posited, stored, discharged, or exposed in such a way as to be a potential
instrument or medium in disease transmission to a person or between
persons;
(6) a vehicle or container that is used to transport garbage, human excreta,
or other organic material and that is defective and allows leakage or spilling
of contents;
(7) a collection of water in which mosquitoes are breeding in the limits of a
municipality;
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should be amended to include an express waiver of immunity for public
health nuisances created by governmental entities.
These revisions to Texas law would maintain the general immunity en-
joyed by governmental actors in Texas, while properly apportioning the
risk and cost of government-created nuisances. It would also, after more
than a century of confusion, remove the law of nuisance-at least in
Texas-from the legal garbage can and elevate it to its proper status as an
essential tool in the tort scheme.
(8) a condition that may be proven to injuriously affect the public health and
that may directly or indirectly result from the operations of a bone boiling or
fat rendering plant, tallow or soap works, or other similar establishment;
(9) a place or condition harboring rats in a populous area;
(10) the presence of ectoparasites, including bedbugs, lice, and mites, sus-
pected to be disease carriers in a place in which sleeping accommodations are
offered to the public;
(11) the maintenance of an open surface privy or an overflowing septic tank
so that the contents may be accessible to flies; and
(12) an object, place, or condition that is a possible and probable medium of
disease transmission to or between humans.
TEX. HEALTH- & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 341.01l (Vernon 2004).
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